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THE DELAWARE BUSINESS TRUST ACT
FAILURE AS THE NEW CORPORATE LAW
ESSAY
Tamar Frankel*

INTRODUCTION
Business trusts have been around for over one hundred years. 1
They have evolved from private trusts and are used as one form of
offering trust services to the public. 2 The Supreme Court has defined a
business trust as
an arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in
accordance with the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held and
managed for the benefit of such persons as may from time to time be
the holders of transferable certificates issued by the trustees showing
the shares into which the beneficial interest in the property is
divided. 3

Like their ancestor, the private trust, business trusts are established
by trust instruments. While some features of business trusts resemble
*

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Dean Ronald Cass,
P rofessor John Langbein of Yale Law School, Professor William Ryckman of Boston University
Law School, and Doneene Damon, Esq. and Mark J. Gentile, Esq., Members, Richard, Layton &
Finger, Wilmington, Del. for their insightful comments on this Essay. Thanks to Bill Hecker,
Esq. and Adam Kirk, Boston University Law School 2L for meticulous research.
1 See Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment
Companies, 13 DEL . J. CORP . L. 421, 425-28 (1988) (reviewing origins of Massachusetts
business trusts).
2 Trust services can be offered through other forms such as corporations and limited
partnerships. See Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Business Trusts, in 2 R. FRANKLIN
BACOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 19.1-.14, at 19-5 (3d ed. Supp. 2001). Historically, business trusts were used
“to obtain the advantages of incorporation without complying with the regulatory and tax burdens
placed on corporations.” Id. at 19-1.
3 Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146-47 (1924).
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those of corporations, business trusts could be viewed as the epitome of
promoters’ freedom.
Trusts allow promoters to design their
organizations any way they wish subject only to the pressures and
judgments of the markets. However, business trusts posed a number of
potential legal uncertainties.4 The Delaware Business Trust Act has
addressed these uncertainties. 5 Therefore, everyone could rejoice when
the Delaware Business Trust Act was passed. In fact, a number of
mutual funds have taken advantage of the Act to benefit from its
clarifications and the flexibility it offers.
But the Delaware Act is far more ambitious. It contains highly
permissive provisions, allowing promoters of business trusts a
staggering degree of freedom to design their relationships with
beneficiaries-investors.
Moreover, the Act explicitly invites
commercial and manufacturing enterprises (“C&M Enterprises”) to take
advantage of this marvelous contract-like organizational form,
emphasizing its liberal contractarian approach and the freedom to write
into or omit from the trust documents anything they wish, or almost
anything.
The flexibility embodied in the definition of the “business trust”
allows the parties forming the business trust to take on such
characteristics of traditional inter vivos trusts, business trusts,
corporations, or partnerships as the parties may desire. This flexibility
is consistent with Delaware’s fundamental policy of freedom of contract
and may be the greatest advantage of the business trust over alternative
forms of business organizations. 6
4 See Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., J.D., Annotation, Modern Status of the Massachusetts or
Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704 (1978 & Supp. 2001) (describing in detail Massachusetts
business trusts and the problems they raise). For example, the status of business trusts is not
always clear. They are unincorporated associations that look and act like corporations, and may
be considered to have violated corporate laws if they do not register as corporations. See id. at
729-30. In addition, their standing to sue and be sued has been challenged in some jurisdictions.
See id. at 719-20. Further, their beneficiaries usually require some control over the trustees and
thereby risk losing limited liability and becoming personally liable for the debts as partners. The
beneficiaries’ status as creditors entitled to petition for involuntary bankruptcy of the business
trusts has been questioned. See id. at 737-39.
5 DEL . CODE ANN . tit. 12, §§ 3801-3824 (1995 & Supp. 2001); see also MD . CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’ NS §§ 12-101 to 12-810 (Supp. 2000). Like its ancestor, the private trust, the
business trust is based on a trust instrument that the trustee must follow. The business that the
trustee has to conduct is embodied in the same instrument on which the form of the trust is based.
The private trust instrument has given rise to a large body of judicial decisions. These decisions
were intended to protect beneficiaries that did not choose the trustee nor the assets of the trust and
who were precluded from controlling the trustee by the very design of the trust. The danger to the
beneficiaries from abuses of a trust by a trustee that was not accoun table to them (the persons
most interested) gave rise to protective measures in interpreting the nature of the trustees’ duties
to the beneficiaries and the nature and scope of the business that trustees were required by the
trust instrument to conduct. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1209 (1995) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Duties]; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CAL . L. REV. 795 (1983) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Law].
6 Fenton & Mazie, supra note 2, at § 19.2, at 19-5.
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Further, the rights of the beneficial owners in trust property, in
section 3805, and the management of the trusts in section 3806, are all
couched in permissive terms: “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise pr ovided
in the governing instrument of a business trust.” 7 Therefore, it seems
that the promoters of these trusts may write their own rules.
In addition, “[t]he principal purpose of the Act is to recognize
expressly the business trust as an alternative form of business
association.” 8 “The Act eliminates the requirement imposed by other
states that the trust be engaged in the conduct of a trade or business or
issue certificates or shares.”9 Any legal business, for-profit or not-forprofit, including presumably commercial business, will do.
Delaware business trusts should look attractive to promoters and
their lawyers. As consent-based organizations 10 they offer lawyers
opportunities for engagement and innovation. To promoters they offer
any organizational form they wish, subject to market acceptance. One
would assume that C&M Enterprises and their lawyers would jump at
this golden opportunity, but in fact they do not. While the Delaware
Business Trust Act is used by Public Trustees for traditional trust
purposes: managing other people’s money and real estate (“Trust
Services”), C&M Enterprises have not used it.
Why has the Delaware Act failed to become the new modern
corporate law? Why does this Act fail to open the new era of flexible
organizations? Every innovation, however brilliant, meets resistance.
People simply resist new organizational forms even if they are the best
and most efficient. They follow the trodden path. 11 Custom and
tradition of both businessmen and their lawyers, lead to the adoption of
existing forms (especially the corporate form). Viewing the puzzle
from a broader perspective I offer other answers, some obvious, and
others less so. Essentially, the costs of adopting the Act as a substitute
for corporate law exceed the benefits of change.
As discussed in Part One of this Essay, a closer look at the
Delaware Act does not support the contractarian interpretation of the
Act, unless it means based on consent (but not contract). Contrary to
this interpretation, business trusts cannot be designed in any form, and
their promoters cannot apply any law they choose. Even though the

7

DEL . CODE ANN . tit. 12, §§ 3805(e), 3806(a) (1995 & Supp. 2000).
Fenton & Mazie, supra note 2, at 19-3.
Id. at 19-4.
I call business trusts “organizations” in the social sense, as entities in which many people
participate subject to certain rules, even though business trusts are not considered legal entities.
11 See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 60, at 120 (3d ed. 1983) (noting that “[a] business trust is an
unattractive investment in that it is not a very familiar form of business to most people”).
However, the author does not agree with the conclusion that f amiliarity will encourage the use of
this form by C&M Enterprises.
8
9
10
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Delaware Business Trust Act on its face seems to be a default rule with
respect to both form and substance of trust law, the permissive
provisions of the Act are far more limited.
The Delaware Act has been interpreted by the business and legal
communities to allow some relaxation of trust law, but not to substitute
for it. Business trusts with some relaxation, must be organized in trust
form and be subject to trust principles. Further, trust instruments
constitute consensual12 arrangements, but are not governed by contract
law,13 trust law, nor under the Delaware Act. In our context “contract”
can be used only as a metaphor for consensual relationships, like the
Republican Party’s “Contract with America” in the 1990’s, but not as a
precise legal classification. Any other interpretation of the Delaware
Act would lead to unacceptable results. Had the Delaware Act allowed
a fully default trust law, which it does not, and had form and substance
been emptied of their original meaning, leaving only the image of trust
(and perhaps the word “trust”), a serious problem of misrepresentation
to investors might arise.
Further, as argued in Part Two, the form and substance of trust law
are not suitable for C&M Enterprises. Therefore, the legal risks and the
costs of adopting a business trust under the Act are likely to outweigh
the benefits. This conclusion is based in part on a fundamental
distinction between legal organizational models—corporation laws, on
the one hand, and trust laws, on the other hand.
Laws offering models for business organizations (corporations,
partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited liability corporations)
cover relationships between the interested parties within the
organizations, and the representation of the organizations in their
dealings with the outside world. None of these laws, however, regulates
the businesses in which the organizations engage. Those commercial
and manufacturing businesses are regulated by other laws, unrelated to
the organizational structures of the businesses. A restaurant can be
owned and managed by a partnership, a limited partnership, and a
corporation. But all restaurants must comply with laws relating to
building structures, protection from fire hazards, and rules governing
hygiene. McDonald’s, an international corporation engaged in the fastfood business, is subject to the same rules on food cleanliness as a fastfood mom-and-pop partnership small restaurant. Moreover, barring few
exceptions, businesses are free to choose their organizational forms,14
12 Some scholars call consensual arrangements “contractarian.” I prefer to use another word
so as not to confuse such arrangements with agreements subject to contract law.
13 See generally Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 5.
14 The laws regulating certain types of businesses, all of which relate to money management,
require those businesses to organize in a certain manner. For example, national banks must be
organized as corporations. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994) (providing that a national banking
association is considered a “body corporate”); see also 12 U.S.C § 21 (1994) (requiring national
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but none can choose the rules that regulate their businesses. 15
This is the legal scheme for organizing businesses and regulating
businesses. One set of laws offers organizational models from which
the actors may choose, and a second set of laws, which are mandatory,
regulates the businesses regardless of organizational form. This scheme
makes sense. The organizational form serves the needs of different
contributors to the business. The regulation of the businesses applies to
all who carry on that business.
The legal scheme described here has one apparent exception, and
that is trust law. Trust law offers an organizational form—a model of
relationship between the actors in the trust arrangement—and rules that
govern the business of trust services. The main reason for this
combined coverage of the form law and regulating law is not hard to
discover. The trust form provides the model of relationship among the
trustee and the beneficiaries. That relationship is the business and the
purpose of the trust. Hence, the relationship of the trustee with the
beneficiaries—the organizational form—and the regulation of trust
business—the trustee’s services to the beneficiaries—are one and the
same. The nature of trust regulation demonstrates its symbiotic
relationship to trust organization. Most trust rules are default rules;
prohibited actions become permissible with the consent of the
beneficia ries or their representatives. 16 Thus, the regulatory scheme is
built on and integrated with the parties’ relationship.
The dual nature of trust law is also evident in its application. The
regulatory part of trust law governs any organization engaged in trust
business, regardless of its form. And when courts did not adopt this
approach but applied corporate organizational laws to Trust Services,
federal law stepped in and changed the rules to apply trust principles to
these services. 17 While the trust form is suitable for Trust Services it is

banking associations to have at least five incorporators and articles of association). Insurance
companies may be organized as mutual companies or as corporations, depending on the state law
under which they are organized. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 1201 (McKinney 2000) (dealing with
incorporation of stock of mutual insurance companies). Investment comp anies may be organized
in any form, subject to a superseding organizational model that resembles a corporation. See
generally TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN T AYLOR SCHWING , T HE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISORS §§ 5.01, 21.01 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing form of
investment company organization).
15 They could, however, influence the rule-makers to introduce changes.
16 See Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 5, at 1231-32.
17 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338 (applying advisory duties of Advisers Act to banks, recognizing
that they do what advisers do); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191
(1963) (recognizing fiduciary nature of investment advisory relationship); 1, 3 FRANKEL &
SCHWING , supra note 14, §§ 5.01, 21.01 (explaining that the Investment Company Act of 1940
regulates trust business of mutual funds for all forms of organization). In 1974 Co ngress passed
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 U.S.C.), which regulates pension funds.
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far less so for C&M Enterprises. Vesting in a trustee the ownership of
trust assets is inconvenient for C&M Enterprises. The right of trustees
to indemnification is inappropriate. Some states do not award limited
liability to trust beneficiaries. The trust form is unique to the common
law legal systems and is not familiar in countries that have adopted the
civil law.
In addition, as Part Three demonstrates, there is a sufficient
number of known legal forms of organizations that meet the needs of
C&M Enterprises: corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, and
limited liability companies. Because the laws containing these forms
are mainly state laws, there are ample states ready to amend the laws to
meet the changing needs of such enterprises. The Delaware Act does
not offer any tax advantages. Further, the seemingly breathtaking
sweep of the Delaware Act is far narrower in light of federal laws that
preempt its application. Hence, this novel organizational form offers no
significant benefits over the existing forms.
For these reasons businessmen and their lawyers will not adopt the
Delaware Act for C&M Enterprises. The Delaware Act, however, is,
and will continue to be, adopted by Public Trustees, because its form
and substance fit, subject to federal laws.
I.

NOTWITHSTANDING ITS P ERMISSIVE APPROACH , THE DELAWARE
BUSINESS TRUST ACT REQUIRES ADHERENCE TO
TRUST FORM AND SUBSTANCE

The Delaware Business Trust Act allows business trusts to engage
in any business they choose:18 a hotel, a restaurant, a manufacturing
enterprise, or an advisory service. Yet this business trust form has not
been used for commercial business in the recent past, and is not used for
C&M Enterprises today. 19 At first glance it is hard to understand why
Delaware’s resolutions of business trusts’ uncertainties and its generous
accommodation to promoters of businesses of all sorts was not snapped
up.

The Act covers trust business and trust form.
18 See DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(a) (1995 & Supp. 2000) (“A business trust may be
organized to carry on any lawful business or activity, whether or not co nducted for profit . . . .”).
19 It seems that some businesses such as oil and gas and other excavations are organized as
trusts. See 16A W ILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF P RIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 8231, at 496 & nn. 6-7 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995) (citing Helvering v. Combs,
296 U.S. 365, 366 (1935) (explaining trusts formed to finance and drill for oil, gas, and other
substances); Peoples Bank v. D’Lo Royalties, Inc., 235 So. 2d 257 (Miss. 1970) (trust formed to
manage oil property); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank, 89 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1935)
(dealing with a trust formed to purchase and sell oil and gas royalties and properties)). But these
lend themselves to this form and to trust law principles applicable to real estate trusts.
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One explanation to this puzzle is that with all its permissiveness,
the Delaware Act does not allow the actors to choose a non-trust form
or apply anything but substantive trust law. As discussed in Part Two,
neither form nor substance of trust law are suitable for C&M
Enterprises.
The Delaware Act is somewhat unclear on the applicability of the
appropriate law to business trusts. After inviting C&M Enterprises to
take advantage of its trust instrument form, the Act provides a default
rule, which could be interpreted to offer promoters a contract-like form,
and full freedom to design the relationships within the organization.
Thus, trust law seems to be a default rule, which the specific provisions
of trust instruments can overcome. The Act states that “[t]he document
creating the trust is the law of the trust.” 20 Addressing the law
applicable to the business trusts, section 3809 states: “Except to the
extent otherwise provided in the governing instrument of a bus iness
trust or in this subchapter, the laws of this State pertaining to trusts are
hereby made applicable to business trusts; provided however, that for
purposes of [taxation] . . . a business trust shall be cla ssified as a
corporation . . . .”21
This provision may suggest that business trusts can be governed by
other branches of the law, depending on the promoters’ choice.
However, there are no authorities on this point. Delaware bar me mbers
are clear that the Act does not allow promoters of a business trust to
eliminate the principles of trust law altogether nor incorporate by
reference the laws of other models of organization, such as corporate
laws, or other branches of law, such as contract laws.22
Thus, it is very unlikely that reference to contract law in its entirety
would be enforced in the context of business trusts. Trustees are
fiduciaries not contract parties and trusts are not contracts.23 Eliminating
all vestiges of fiduciary duties is an unlikely interpretation of an act
establishing a business trust. Besides, the Act was designed to address
the problems that non-statutory business trusts raised. One of the issues
concerning such trusts was the incorporation of other trust laws into the
trust documents by reference. This tactic was generally approved by the
courts because the choice of the applicable trust laws was in line with
some important component of the trust (e.g., the real estate trust
property location). 24 There is no precedent, to my know ledge, of an
20 Nathan Isaacs, Note, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 HARV. L . REV. 1048, 1052
(1929) quoted in Fenton & Manzie, supra note 2, § 19.2, at 19-5.
21 DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3809 (Supp. 2000).
22 Telephone Interview with Doneene Damon, Esq., and Mark J. Gentile, Esq., Members,
Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Del. (Feb. 2, 2001).
23 See 3 AUSTIN W AKEMAN SCOTT & W ILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, T HE L AW OF T RUSTS
§ 197.2, at 192 (4th ed. 1988); 2A id. § 169, at 311 (1987).
24 See Chermside, supra note 4 (providing a detailed description of Massachusetts business
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attempt to incorporate an erasure of trust law principles or to
incorporate an entirely different branch of the law into business trust
documents, let alone an approval of such incorporation by the courts. It
should be noted that the new Uniform Trust Code,25 applicable to
private trusts, is more permissive than prior judicial decisions, but does
not cover such broad grounds. In sum, the Delaware Bus iness Trust Act
applies trust law on business trusts, regardless of their operations, and is
not a default rule with respect to the form or substance of the law.
II.

TRUST LAW IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE DOES NOT
FIT C&M ENTERPRISES

Legal scheme for organizational models and regulatory laws .
To understand the difficulties of using trust law for other than Trust
Services, it is helpful to examine trust law within the legal scheme.
Organizational models and substantive regulation of businesses are
generally separate. Further, organizational model laws are for the
choosing. In contrast, laws that regulate businesses are mandatory, and
apply to the same businesses regardless of how they are orga nized. The
one exception to this scheme is trust law. As elaborated in Part Three,
that combination explains why the Delaware Business Trust Act is not
suitable for businesses other than Trust Services, both in terms of form
and in terms of regulatory law.
The laws providing models of organizational forms, such as
partnerships, limited partnerships, corporations, and limited liability
corporations, offer standardized internal structure for the relationships
among those who control the activities of an organization and those who
provide labor and capital. A partnership model is suitable for those who
contribute labor—and often capital—to the enterprise, and have control
and power of representing the enterprise, with a partial status of a legal
entity. A corporation offers an organizational form that constitutes a
legal entity, in which labor, capital, and control are generally separate
roles even when they are exercised by the same in dividuals. A trust
offers a form that is not a legal entity. Control and title to ownership of
the trust property are vested in the trustee, and are separate from
beneficial ownership. These models can be adjusted to the parties’
desires to some extent, but the basic features of these organizations
must be retained, once the form is chosen.
A quick review of the organizational models laws demonstrates
that these laws deal with the relationships among the interest groups
within the organizations. None of these laws regulate the businesses in

trusts).
25 UNIF. T RUST CODE (2000), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/trust1009.htm.

FRANKELGLY5 NEW 2

2001]

11/21/01 6:01 PM

FRANKEL’S TITLE GOES HERE

9

which the organizations engage. The businesses that organizations
engage in are regulated by other laws, which are not usually related to
the organizational structures of the businesses.
Barring a few
exceptions, businesses are free to choose their organizational forms.26
But none can choose the rules that regulate their businesses, although
some relaxation of the rules governing trust investment services is
permissible under the common law. The one exception to this division
of form and business regulation is the trust. Traditional trust law
governs both form and business of trustees. Business trust laws are like
private trust laws on this score; form and substance have not been
severed.
Why does trust law include both trust form and regulation of
Trust Services? The most obvious reason for the combined form and
substantive regulation in trust law is that the form—relationship
between trustees and beneficiaries—and the Trust Services are one and
the same. Trust Services are the relationship among the members of the
organization: the trustee and the beneficiaries. The main function of
trustees involves the same rules as those of the organizational structure,
as well as the duties of those who control the assets of others. There are
no other functions, and the relationships of the trustees with third parties
are very limited. Hence, the regulation of the trustee is included in the
same body of law that provides the form of the trust.
Trust form and trust law remain closely related even though
the Trust Services have expanded to the management of financial
assets and to public offering of Trust Services.27 The public offering
of Trust Services has changed the relationship between trustee and
beneficiaries, to resemble corporations. Business trusts have more
beneficiaries than private trusts do but they still remain intact as an
association notwithstanding the change in the identity of their
beneficiaries. In contrast to most private trusts, the trustors of business
trusts are usually the beneficiaries and not third parties.
The
beneficiaries of business trusts require a measure of control over the
trustee and a voice in changing the trust instruments. In these respects
business trusts are different from private trusts and similar to
corporations.
Today as in the past, business trust law regulates both form and
business, which it does in the case of private trusts. The essence of the
business has remained Trust Services. Because mass offering of Trust
Services is crucial to the stability of the financial system, federal laws
See supra note 14.
One of the reasons for these organizational changes was the desire of trustees to offer more
streamlined and less custom-made trust services. Arguably, this form was also designed to
circumvent the limitations on the use of corporate forms. After all, the trust form was hatched
and developed to circumvent legal limitations and burdens.
26
27
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have preempted a significant part of state laws. Not surprisingly,
federal laws also regulate organizational forms and Trust Services in the
same laws.28
Trust law governs Trust Services; trust law will govern C&M
Enterprises. Those who view business trusts as corporations suggest
that bus iness trusts should be regulated as corporations, even if they
offer Trust Services. That means that the corporate form will dictate the
duties and liabilities of the trustee-directors to the beneficiariesshareholders. Yet, the reverse result should govern. If a corporation
manages other people’s money and performs Trust Services, it is
regulated as a trust, and its duties to the beneficiaries are trustees’
duties. It may be that the corporation will be deemed the trustee and not
the corporate directors. But that difference is technical. Directors of a
corporation that carries on a trust business must see to it that the
corporation will perform its duties under the law of trusts, and if they do
not, the directors will be liable for violating their duty of care.29 That
duty is linked to the type of business that the corporation manages, and
not to their status as directors. Directors of a corporation that manages
an explosives factory will be remiss in their duty if they do not make
sure that the corporation carries insurance against explosions. Directors
of a corporation that manages a trust business will be remiss in their
duties if they do not ensure that the corporation carries insurance against
embezzlement by its employees, or do not segregate the trust assets
from their own and do not earmark them and do not deposit them with a
reliable bank. 30 A partnership would be subject to the same rules and
28 The death of business trusts (investment companies) in the beginning of the 1930s and the
death of the investment management industry ended in federal legislation. The last two of the
five acts Congress passed during the thirties addressed the issues of the financial system. The
Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act, both passed in 1940, provide overriding
organizational form and rules regulating the business of mass-produced and offered trust services.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 to -64 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21(1994 & Supp. V 1999). State legislation has a
limited impact, and is operative only to the extent that it does not conflict with federal law.
Similarly, in 1974 Co ngress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29
U.S.C.), regulating pension funds, which preempted trust law as a form of organization and as a
regulation of trust business. The Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated trust law
regulations that apply to bank departments acting as private trustees and as pension trustees. See
12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-.20 (2000) (retaining much of state trust law). The organizational form of this
trustee is a department of a bank, and the Comptroller’s rules apply to it. The residual rules
relating to organization and trust business are the state laws, and the Delaware Business Trust Act
is one of them. The bifurcation of trust law is now dual: it exists as an organizational law and as
a regulating law in both state law and federal law.
29 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (providing an illustration of a
director’s breach of their fiduciary duty of care).
30 See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (holding a director of a
corporation that operated a reinsurance business and held premiums in trust liable for
misappropriation of the trust funds and emphasizing that the corp oration was a trustee and the
director had high duties of care, which she did not meet); see also McGlynn v. Schultz, 218 A.2d
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liabilities. In sum, trust regulation applies to an organization that
offers trust services regardless of the form of the organization.31
Moreover, the substance of trust law will apply to those who carry
on a non-trust business, if they are organized as business trusts.32
Further, the trustees’ duties to the beneficiaries (shareholders) will be
subject to trust law, in addition to the regulation of their non-business.
If the two conflict, the trustees have to comply with trust duties. This is
an unchartered area because there are no trusts that manage C&M
businesses. When trust property is an ongoing business, the business is
usually organized as a corporation and the trustees are vested with the
shares. To be sure, the Delaware Business Trust was not available
before 1991, but we still do not see changes in this area. I maintain that
the trust structure is not used for C&M enterprises because in trust law
one cannot separate form and substance. The literal language of the
Delaware Act may be interpreted to allow a business trust that is a trust
neither in form nor in substance.33 Yet, as discussed, that was not the
intent of the legislation. Besides, this interpretation leads to a
problematic result. An organization that has eliminated in the trust
instrument its trust duties and has adopted another internal relationship
with the shareholders may mislead the shareholders and investors if it
implies that the form of organization carries with it also trust regulation,
which is stricter than the actual regulation that applies to the C&M
Enterprise. For example, there is a law that prohibits the use of the term
408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966) (finding directors liable for not insisting on segregation of
trust funds held by the corporation), aff’d, 231 A.2d 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
31 See Carney v. Sam Houston Underwriters, Inc., 272 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954)
(“We believe that a corporation in the trust business and lawfully advertising itself as a trust
company is a trust company just as much as a company in the lumber business is a lumber
company.”).
32 See Gunter v. Janes, 9 Cal. 643, 658 (1858) (finding that a trustee who is also a creditor is
bound by his obligations as trustee). But see, e.g., Spinoso v. Heilman (In re Heilman), 241 B.R.
137, 159 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999) (explaining that the parties’ use of the word trust was not
determinative in the context of the Bankruptcy Code for determining the parties relationship )
(citing Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365 (1891)).
33 Once the beneficiaries sign off, they have presumably agreed to the terms. Not only that;
the terms need not be specified in the instrument. They can be mentioned by reference. § 3801
(f) provides:
A governing instrument:
May provide that a person shall become a beneficial owner and shall
become bound by the governing instrument if such person (or a representative
authorized by such person orally, in writing or by other action such as payment for a
beneficial interest) co mplies with the conditions for becoming a beneficial owner set
forth in the governing instrument or any other writing and acquires a beneficial
interest; and
(2) May consist of 1 or more agreements, instruments or other writings and may
include or incorporate bylaws containing provisions relating to the business of the
business trust, the conduct of its affairs and its rights or powers or the rights or powers
of its trustees, beneficial owners, agents or employees.
DEL . CODE ANN . tit. 12, § 3801(f) (1995).
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“bank” except for approved banks.34 There is no specific law that
prohibits the use of the term “trust.” But the general law of fraudulent
misrepresentation applies to all names and may apply to such a name
under these circumstances.
Trust Services and C&M Enterprises are fundamentally
different. This is the opinion of those who offer Trust Services and
those who manage C&M Enterprises. C&M Enterprises are not using
the Delaware Act, because they are not offering Trust Services.
Investment managers, the Public Trustees offering Trust Services, reject
the role of Enterprise managers. They did not accept the suggestion of a
number of scholars that mutual funds and pension funds become active
shareholders involved in the operations of Enterprises. Investment
managers, even of state pension funds, which are the most active funds,
declined to appoint representative directors to the boards of corporations
in which the funds held a significant number of shares. 35 When
dissatisfied with the corporate management of their investments, these
trustees-investment managers sell the shares. They “exit” rather than
exercise “voice.” When they are required to vote; for example, when
corporations propose merger or are targets of takeovers, investment
managers prefer to follow their shareholders’ directives on how to vote
rather than use their discretion. When there is no escape, they act as
creditors but not as business managers. Investment managers have
justified their abstention from activism on the ground, among others,
that investment management is different and distinct from corporate
management. Monitoring is not operating 36 and their expertise is in
monitoring. I believe, however, that they know their business quite
well, and would become activists if this were part of their business.
Furthermore, private trustees that manage inherited business usually
hold the shares of the businesses rather than the position of directors.
However, this pattern may be due to the fact that most such trusts were
established before the Delaware Act was passed. The future will tell
whether businesses given in trust will be reorganized as Delaware
Business Trusts.
III.

THE DELAWARE BUSINESS TRUST ACT DOES NOT OFFER
ADVANTAGES TO C&M ENTERPRISES

C&M Enterprises do not use the Delaware Business Trust Act
because there are sufficient known legal forms of organizations that
See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 669 (McKinney 1982).
See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan-Feb. 1994, at 140 (noting that institutional investors adopt shareholder activism only if its
expected benefits exceed its expected costs).
36 See id.
34
35
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meet their needs: corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, and
limited liability companies. These models are governed by state laws,
and there are states that meet the changing needs of such enterprises by
amending their laws. 37 Therefore, a novel organizational form,
especially a form that poses uncertainties and has not been used before
for C&M Enterprises, must offer significant benefits over the existing
available forms or remedy serious flaws in available forms.
While the Act recognizes the inescapable fact that business trusts
are organizations and clarifies their ambiguous position (e.g.,
recognizing them as legal entities),38 the Delaware Act entitles
promoters to design the constitutive instruments of this legal entity as
they wish. The implications of this distinction will be discussed later.
I searched for basic flaws of the current legal models of C&M
Enterprises, looking for expressions by the bar and businesses of
dissatisfactions with the existing organizational models, or the desire for
more freedom to shape them. I found none.39 I note amendments of
corporate laws and partnership laws that relax the fiduciary duties of the
managers of the enterprises, converting mandatory rules into default
rules, especially in relationship to the duty of care.40 I also draw the
reader’s attention to a relaxation of the requirement for annual
shareholder meetings, which is costly for publicly held corporations and
causes problems of acquiring quorums. 41 Further, the limited liability
company acts allow parties to design their relationships, and thereby
take advantage of pass-through tax treatment. The literature does not
demonstrate any problems either. Of course it is difficult to prove the
negative. All that can be said here is that there are no signs of
complaints about existing organizational forms. I conclude that there is
no shortage of available legal forms to accommodate the needs of C&M
37 See DEL . CODE . ANN . tit. 8, § 211(a) (Supp. 2000) (allowing board to authorize
stockholders’ meetings by remote communication); see also id. § 211(b) (allowing stockholders
to elect directors by written consent unless certificate of incorporation provides otherwise); MD .
CODE ANN ., CORPS. & ASS’ NS § 2-501(b) (1999) (allowing charter or bylaws of a registered
investment company to provide that the corporation need not hold annual meetings in a year
when election of directors is not required); John Nuveen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,383, at 77,198, 77,201 (Nov. 18,
1986) (interpreting section 32(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to generally not require
investment companies to hold annual shareholder meetings, unless the Act specifically requires a
shareholder action).
38 See DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(a) (1995 & Supp. 2000).
39 See Telephone Interview with Mark Gentile, Esq., Member, Richards, Layton & Finger,
Wilmington, Del. (Jan. 29, 2001) (noting that the limited liability company acts meet the tax
needs with which many businesses are concerned).
40 See DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2000) (allowing in most cases a provision in
the certificate of incorporation eliminating personal liability of directors for breach of fiduciary
duty); MD . CODE ANN ., CORPS. & ASS’ NS § 2-104(b)(8) (Supp. 2000) (allowing in most cases a
provision in the articles of inco rporation which varies the standards for liability of directors and
officers); id. § 2-405.2 (1999) (allowing similar provisions in the charter).
41 See supra note 37.
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Enterprises.
Possible advantages. What about a self-perpetuating board?
Assume that C&M Enterprise’s promoters may be enticed to use the
business trust if the form would allow them to establish a selfperpetuating board. After all, the private trust is in fact an organization
that precludes the beneficiaries’ control, and most not-for-profit
organizations have self-perpetuating boards. Such boards exist when
there are no voters. Promoters of C&M Enterprises may follow suit and
eliminate voting, which is costly, and acquire greater control over the
enterprises. So long as shareholders are able to exit the organization by
selling their shares they will not exercise “voice” unless they have a
significant stake in the enterprise. In such a case they may negotiate the
right to place their choice on the board. The trust instrument may
permit directors to sell directorships without investments in the
Delaware business trusts. On its face, there is nothing in the Act to
prohibit such contractarian trust instruments.
I do not know what the reaction of the market would be to such an
innovation. I suspect that few can anticipate whether other enterprises
will follow this structure or whether shareholders will reject the
innovation, or whether state or federal legislators will negate these
structures. I do believe that such a step may cause some reaction. The
trend in recent years has been to strengthen the boards’ independence of
management, and at the same time to require from them a higher degree
of accountability. 42 Thus, the risk of taking this step and its effects on
share prices and the ability to raise capital seems quite high. 43
Promoters have sufficient means to maintain control through
management positions and the choice of the initial board members.
Thus, they need not maintain their control in a way that runs counter to
the general trend today and is quite risky. Therefore, I doubt whether
the possibility of self-perpetuating control or even the conversion of
office into property for sale 44 is sufficiently beneficial for pr omoters to
42 See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16,
2001) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) (requiring investment companies relying
on certain exemptive rules to have a majority of independent directors on their boards; requiring
independent directors of these comp anies to select and nominate other independent directors;
requiring legal counsel for independent directors to be independent; requiring further disclosure
about directors); Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured
Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1996) (adv ocating equitybased director compensation to encourage active management); Charles M. Elson, Executive
Overcompensation—A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1993) (advocating stock
ownership and lengthened board terms to encourage active shareholder input).
43 See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 11, § 60, at 120 (noting that “[a] business trust is an
unattractive investment in that it is not a very familiar form of business to most people, and there
can be little or no control in the certificate holders (beneficiaries) over the affairs of the trust” and
that “[t]he amount of credit obtainable is limited by the solvency of the trust since the
beneficiaries usually are not perso nally liable.”) (footnote omitted).
44 This conversion negates the very essence of directors’ fiduciary duties. See Frankel,
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take the risk.
What about reducing liabilities on management and the
directors? Another benefit which promoters may reap from adopting a
business trust form is the reduction or elimination of the liabilities of
directors and management to shareholders. Even though corporate
laws, including Delaware corporation law, have converted the duty of
care from a mandatory duty to a default rule, in which the level of
directors’ duty of care can be lowered, corporate laws have maintained
the duty of loyalty as mandatory. 45 So has the new Uniform Trust
Code.46 The Delaware Act does not seem to limit the promoters’ ability
to erase the duty of loyalty and care altogether. That does not mean,
however, that the promoters can do that in reality.
For starters, the Delaware bar does not accept this interpretation
and the courts are also unlikely to accept it. Most likely, the courts will
interpret the Act as limiting the ability of the promoters to seek or rely
on such a waiver on the ground that the shareholders’ consent by
definition is uninformed. The waiver can cover future broad conflicts
of interest or embezzlement that may result in serious losses to
shareholders. Shareholders will not be presumed to have anticipated
such losses by waiver. My doubt persists notwithstanding the provision
of the Act that the purchase of the shares of the business trust
constitutes consent to the provisions of the trust instrument. 47
In addition, the Delaware legislature or federal legislators may
overrule the waivers. Further, it is unclear that shareholders will accept
such a waiver. A provision that drastically reduces the management’s
and director-trustees’ liabilities sends a signal to shareholders that the
people who control the enterprises are concerned about liability for acts
that may injure shareholders. To be sure, the desire for protection
against litigation is understandable, but it is doubtful whether protection
from judicial scrutiny that leaves accountability entirely to the markets
will be lightly used or accepted. Thus, it may be that the trust
instrument will contain a somewhat increased protection for
management and directors, but not a very extreme one. The speculative
benefits must be weighed against the speculative costs.
How about imposing fiduciary duties of the management and
Fiduciary Law, supra note 5, at 803 n.24 (1983).
45 See DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i) (Supp. 2000); MD . CODE ANN ., CTS & JUD .
P ROC. § 5-418(a)(1) (1998) (providing that charter may not restrict or limit liabilities of directors
or officers to extent that they received “improper benefit[s]”).
46 See UNIF. T RUST CODE § 802 (2000), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/trust
1009.htm.
47 See DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(f)(1) (1995) (stating that governing instrument may
provide that person who complies with conditions for becoming beneficial owner and acquires
beneficial interest becomes bound by governing instrument); cf. UNIF. T RUST CODE § 1008(a)(1)
(2000) (limiting waivers to good faith actions), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/trust
1009.htm.
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directors towards debt security holders? The arguments for and
against imposing fiduciary duties towards debt security holders on
corporate directors have raged for a number of years. 48 The courts have
declined to impose such duties except when the enterprise has become
insolvent or close to becoming insolvent. 49 Generally debt security
holders must specify their rights and gain their protection from the
terms of their debt obligations (and the trust indenture). An enterprise
that is highly leveraged may desire to provide beneficial rights for its
debt security holders, and arguably, the bus iness trust form will enable
it to do so. I am not sure whether and under what circumstances such a
desire would rise. Assuming it does, the question is whether existing
organizational structures and form models would not allow for the
establishment of such rights; for example, by allotting common shares
or voting rights to debt security holders. Most corporate laws are
sufficiently broad and permissive to allow the issuance of such
instruments. If they are not issued, I believe the reasons are business
reasons, not legal limits. Other mechanisms exist as well. To the extent
that banks, for example, desire to have insider information about the
affairs of the enterprise in order to protect their interests, the banks
bargain for a directorship to the board. Thus, one can achieve this
purpose without embarking on a risky legal venture of a business trust.
The scope of the Delaware Act is narrower than it seems. The
Act promises far more than it can deliver because some of its
permissive provisions are preempted fully or partially by federal laws.
For example, the Act provides relief from the costs of obtaining
investors’ consent to the trust instruments. Section 3801(f)(1) of the
Delaware statute states:
A governing instrument:
(1) May provide that a person shall become a beneficial owner and
shall become bound by the governing instrument if such person (or a
representative authorized by such person orally, in writing or by
other action such as payment for a beneficial interest) complies with
the conditions for becoming a beneficial owner set forth in the
governing instrument or any other writing and acquires a beneficial
interest. . . .50

48 See, e.g., Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Co rporate
Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL . J. CORP . L. 1
(1995); Robert Dean Ellis, Securitization Vehicles, Fiduciary Duties and Bondholders’ Rights, 24
J. CORP . L. 295 (1999); Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the
Debate Over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1.
49 See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS
215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
50 DEL . CODE ANN . tit. 12, § 3801(f)(1) (1995).
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Therefore, the purchase of a trust share signifies an agreement to
the trust instrument. An oral authority signifies an acceptance. If an
investor says to the sales person: “If you think that the trust instrument
is OK, then I will buy the shares offered by the trust,” that is sufficient
to bind the investors.
But if investors wish to read the trust instrument, especially if the
instrument does not represent a form contract but the creation of the
promoter-trustee, then the following provision in section 3801(f)(2)
could be used:
A governing instrument: . . .
(2) May consist of 1 or more agreements, instruments or other
writings and may include or incorporate bylaws containing
provisions relating to the business of the business trust, the conduct
of its affairs and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its
trustees,
beneficial
owners,
agents
or
employees.51

Investors may receive a trust instrument that either is comprised of
many agreements, or better still, contains these agreements by reference.
Unless the investors are investing significant amounts of money and are
prepared to invest significant amounts of time (or their lawyers’ time),
they will not read the instrument but may buy the trust shares.52
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 preempt most of these generous provisions . First, public
offerings are subject to the requirement of extensive disclosure
documents that must be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Second, even non-public offerings must be accompanied
by more than the requirements of the Delaware Act.53 In private trusts it
is likely that the trustor and the trustee will negotiate the terms of the
trust on a one-to-one basis. In a public trust no such negotiation takes
place. That is why the securities acts fill in the void. Thus, by buying a
security an investor should not be deemed to have agreed to the terms of
the security or be bound to other trust instrument provisions without full
disclosure. In fact, it seem that these provisions of the Delaware Act
Id.§ 3801(f)(2).
For public trust forms that conduct trust business, however, these provisions would rarely
apply. In most cases they would conflict with the federal securities acts, and especially the
Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -64 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-1 to –21 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). These acts require far more explicit disclosure
and approvals of shareholders and clients as well as the boards of directors of investment
companies to various changes. Hence, the business trusts that could take advantage of these
provisions must be non-public.
53 See also UNIF. T RUST CODE § 105(b)(8), (9) (2000) (duty to inform and report is
mandatory), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/trust1009.htm; § 813 (duty to inform and
report).
51
52
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have little if any effect on both Public Trustees and C&M Enterprises.
Even Public Trustees cannot take advantage of many
permissions offered in the Delaware Act. Investment companies are
governed by the Investment Company Act of 1940 which regulates their
form, financial structure, operations, and some of their investments as
well as conflicts of interest of their affiliates.54 The scope of the
Delaware Act is therefore limited to those situations in which the
federal laws do not apply expressly or impliedly. For example,
shareholders’ meetings need not be held annually if there are not
elections of new directors. 55 Similarly, insurance companies, regulated
under state laws, cannot escape their form and substantive regulation by
organizing as a business trust. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 has preempted all state trust laws. 56 Since trust
law includes both form and substantive regulation the Delaware Act is
preempted as well, and federal banking laws will continue to trump the
Act.
Further, C&M Enterprises cannot take advantage of the
Delaware Act to overcome the substantive regulation of their
businesses, even if this regulation is contained in state laws. Any
change that C&M Enterprises make in the business trust will pertain to
form only. No other outcome seems possible.
The Delaware Act does not offer tax relief or advantages. For
both Public Trustees and C&M Enterprises the Delaware Act does not
offer any relief from tax burdens. The Act expressly provides that
Delaware business trusts will be taxed as corporations. 57 To be sure,
under the Tax Code investment companies, banks, and insurance
companies are afforded pass-through tax treatment. C&M Enterprises
that organize as partnerships, limited partnerships or some types of
limited liability companies benefit from pass-through tax treatment,
subject to certain conditions. The Delaware Act does not relieve
business trusts from the conditions. 58
See generally FRANKEL & SCHWING , supra note 14.
See John Nuveen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,383, at 77,198 (Nov. 18, 1986).
56 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 U.S.C.). ERISA regulates pension
funds, which preempted trust law both as a form of organization and as a regulation of trust
business. The Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated trust law regulations that apply to
bank departments acting as private trustees and as pension trustees. 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-.20 (2000).
The organizational form of this trustee is a department of a bank, and the Comptroller’s rules
apply to it. The residual rules relating to organization and trust business are the state laws, and
the Delaware Business Trust Act is one of them. The bifurcation of trust law is now dual: it
exists as an organizational law and as a regulating law in both state law and federal law.
57 See DEL . CODE ANN . tit 12, § 3809 (1995 & Supp. 2000).
58 But if, hypothetically, the Act is interpreted to require a corporate classification for tax
treatment, then C&M Enterprises that could use other forms of organization will avoid resorting
to Delaware business trust for this reason.
54
55
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Some states, such as Texas, do not recognize the limited
liability status of beneficiaries of business trusts.59 This posture
renders the business trust form disadvantageous and risky for businesses
that operate nationally, depending on the forum state choice of law.
Since the trust is a common law institution, lawyers, business persons,
and courts in countries with code-based legal systems are not familiar
with trust law and concepts. Thus, Delaware business trusts are
unattractive for Enterprises that operate interstate and internationally.
Raising Capital. It has long been suggested that the business trust
form is not conducive to obtaining credit or raising new capital, which
C&M Enterprises, especially developing Enterprises, might need. 60
Further, a holding company in the form of a trust may raise problems
under the antitrust statutes. The trust form is used as a tool for the
business of investment management, and until it was outlawed, to
maintain monopolies and to overcome the prohibition on creating
holding companies. 61 These difficulties, however, may be remedied by
a sympathetic and accommodating state legislature. Trusts that are used
for the process of securitizing debt prove the point. These trusts are not
used to raise funds for other business but rather to hold financial assets
and protect them from the bankruptcy and risk of the transferor of the
assets. In sum, the trusts serve in the classic role of trustees.62
Notwithstanding its “contractarian” image, Delaware Act
business trusts are not endowed with contract privileges. Trust
instruments, whether in a private trust or a Public Trust, do not belong
to the contract category;63 trust remedies cover more than contract
remedies. 64 Presumably, trust instruments are not contracts for purposes
of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. 65 Therefore,

59 See Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 S.W.554 (Tex. 1925); Loomis Land & Cattle Co. v.
Diversified Mortgage Investors, 533 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
60 See supra note 43.
61 See, e.g., H.R. Res., 50th Cong., 19 CONG . REC. 719 (1888) (enacted), reprinted in 1 T HE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 53 (Earl
W. Kintner ed. 1978) (House resolution authorizing Commission on Manufactures to investigate
trusts); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 477 n.127 (1998).
62 See 1 T AMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING , FINANCIAL ASSETS
P OOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES §§ 8.1 to .24 (1991).
63 See 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 197.2, at 192 (“[T]he creation of a trust,
although it may involve the elements usually found in the making of a contract, is not treated as a
contract.”); 2A id. § 169, at 311 (“[The trustee’s] duty to administer the trust is not a contractual
duty. . . .”). However, the trustee may enter into a contract with the settlor in connection with the
trust, if the trustee agrees to do something other than perform Trust Services. See, e.g., 3 id. §
197.2, at 192.
64 See 3 id. § 197.2, at 191 (stating that beneficiary has no action at law for breach of
contract).
65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. . . .”).
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the constraints of the Contract Clause do not apply to their regulation. 66
In addition, the interpretation of contracts differs from that of
legislation, and the trust instruments must give way to the legislation. 67
The seeming freedom of the promoter in designing the trust instruments
is subject to statutory regulation.
CONCLUSION
The Delaware Business Trust Act is extremely helpful to Public
Trustees; it solves most of the problems facing unincorporated bus iness
trusts. Therefore, investment companies have reincorporated under the
Delaware Act. Similarly, Special Purpose Vehicles, a unique type of
passive investment companies that are used to convert illiquid debt and
loans into liquid and tradable securities, make use of the Delaware
Act.68 But the Act has not relaxed the regulation of the Public Trustees,
such as pension funds and mutual funds. Most of these Public Trustees
are regulated by federal law, covering their financial structure, nature
and terms of the beneficial interests, disclosure requirements, and
fiduciary duties.
In addition, federal law provides government
preventive enforcement and imposes self-enforcement on Public
Trustees. Federal laws have been stricter than the private trust laws.
66 Courts have adopted a two-part t est to determine whether legislation violates the Contract
Clause. First, there must be a contractual relationship, the legislation must impair that
relatio nship, and the impairment must be substantial. Second, if there is substantial impairment,
the court determines whether it is “reasonable and necessary to achieve a valid state interest.”
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1486 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 10
F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993).
67 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & P UB. P OL’ Y 59, 60 (1988) (stating that statutes, like contracts, “should be read . . . to find
their reasonable import”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and
Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 CAL . L. REV. 1127, 1130-35 (1994) (comparing classical
and modern interpretation of contracts); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA . L. REV. 713
(1997) (advocating that standard terms be interpreted like laws, but customized terms with
reference to circumstances, with a presumption that the term has a meaning different from the
corresponding standard term); Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”?
The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1157
(1998) (contrasting “classical approach” to contract interpretation and “intentionalist approach”);
id. at 1185 n.223 (“arguing that the use of negotiating history in the interpretation of a collective
bargaining contract is simpler than the use of legislative history in the interpretation of a statute”
(discussing James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 MO . L. REV. 283, 307-08, 313 (1995));
Westbrook, supra, 305-06 (1995) (“There are as many problems with sole reliance on text in the
interpretation of labor contracts, as there are in the interpret ation of statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
68 These Special Purpose Vehicles offer classic Trustee Services, and the Delaware Act fits
perfectly the needs of their organizers as well as their investors. This view was verified.
Telephone Interview with Doneene Damon, Esq, Member, Richards, Layton & Finger,
Wilmington, Del. (Feb. 1, 2001).
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To C&M Enterprises the Delaware Business Trust Act promised
more than it delivered. Enterprises have not used business trusts and are
unlikely to use them in the future. The reason is that notwithstanding its
permissive provisions the Delaware Act requires that business trusts
remain trusts in form and substantive law. Business trusts are not
corporations; trust instruments are not contracts. Trust law is ne ither
corporate law nor contract law, and its form and substance are not
suitable for C&M Enterprises.
Some readers may conclude that the Delaware Act can be emptied
of its trust form and substance. They may hope that business trusts will
emerge as novel organizations that are contract-based and contractregulated. This Essay demonstrates that the conclusion is wrong, and
the hope is illusory.

